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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty of Walley, in which
beliefs are represented through sets of probability distributions, and we focus on the prob-
lem of modeling prior ignorance about a categorical random variable. In this setting, it is
a known result that a state of prior ignorance is not compatible with learning. To over-
come this problem, another state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, has been proposed.
Near-ignorance resembles ignorance very closely, by satisfying some principles that can
arguably be regarded as necessary in a state of ignorance, and allows learning to take place.
What this paper does, is to provide new and substantial evidence that also near-ignorance
cannot be really regarded as a way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in
conditions of very weak beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting character-
ized by a variable of interest that is latent. We argue that such a setting is by far the most
common case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical latent variables (and
general manifest variables) a condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place un-
der prior near-ignorance. This condition is shown to be easily satisfied even in the most
common statistical problems. We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against
the possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems.
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1 Introduction
Epistemic theories of statistics are often confronted with the question of prior ig-
norance. Prior ignorance means that a subject, who is about to perform a statistical
analysis, is missing substantial beliefs about the underlying data-generating pro-
cess. Yet, the subject would like to exploit the available sample to draw some sta-
tistical conclusion, i.e., the subject would like to use the data to learn, moving away
from the initial condition of ignorance. This situation is very important as it is often
desirable to start a statistical analysis with weak assumptions about the problem of
interest, thus trying to implement an objective-minded approach to statistics.
A fundamental question is whether prior ignorance is compatible with learning or
not. Walley gives a negative answer for the case of his self-consistent (or coherent)
theory of statistics based on the modeling of beliefs through sets of probability dis-
tributions. He shows, in a very general sense, that vacuous prior beliefs, i.e., beliefs
that a priori are maximally imprecise, lead to vacuous posterior beliefs, irrespec-
tive of the type and amount of observed data [11, Section 7.3.7]. At the same time,
he proposes focusing on a slightly different state of beliefs, called near-ignorance,
that does enable learning to take place [11, Section 4.6.9]. Loosely speaking, near-
ignorant beliefs are beliefs that are vacuous for a proper subset of the functions
of the random variables under consideration (see Section 3). In this way, a near-
ignorance prior still gives one the possibility to express vacuous beliefs for some
functions of interest, and at the same time it maintains the possibility to learn from
data. The fact that learning is possible under prior near-ignorance is shown, for in-
stance, in the special case of the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM) [12,1]. This is a
popular model, based on a near-ignorance set of priors, used in the case of inference
from categorical data generated by a multinomial process.
Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether near-ignorance can be really regarded
as a possible way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of
very weak beliefs. We carry out this investigation in a setting made of categorical
data generated by a multinomial process, like in the IDM, but we consider near-
ignorance sets of priors in general, not only that used in the IDM.
The interest in this investigation is motivated by the fact that near-ignorance sets of
priors appear to play a crucially important role in the question of modeling prior
ignorance about a categorical random variable. The key point is that near-ignorance
sets of priors can be made to satisfy two principles: the symmetry and the embed-
ding principles. The first is well known and is equivalent to Laplace’s indifference
principle; the second states, loosely speaking, that if we are ignorant a priori, our
prior beliefs on an event of interest should not depend on the space of possibilities
in which the event is embedded (see Section 3 for a discussion about these two
principles). Walley [11], and later de Cooman and Miranda [3], have argued exten-
sively on the necessity of both the symmetry and the embedding principles in order
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to characterize a condition of ignorance about a categorical random variable. This
implies, if we agree that the symmetry and the embedding principles are necessary
for ignorance, that near-ignorance sets of priors should be regarded as an espe-
cially important avenue for a subject who wishes to learn starting in a condition of
ignorance.
Our investigation starts by focusing on a setting where the categorical variable X
under consideration is latent. This means that we cannot observe the realizations of
X, so that we can learn about it only by means of another, not necessarily categor-
ical, variable S, related to X through a known conditional probability distribution
P (S |X). Variable S is assumed to be manifest, in the sense that its realizations can
be observed (see Section 2). The intuition behind the setup considered, made of
X and S, is that in many real cases it is not possible to directly observe the value
of a random variable in which we are interested, for instance when this variable
represents a patient’s health and we are observing the result of a diagnostic test. In
these cases, we need to use a manifest variable (the medical test) in order to obtain
information about the original latent variable (the patient’s health). In this paper,
we regard the passage from the latent to the manifest variable as made by a process
that we call the observational process. 1
Using the introduced setup, we give a condition in Section 4, related to the likeli-
hood function, that is shown to be sufficient to prevent learning about X under prior
near-ignorance. The condition is very general as it is developed for any set of pri-
ors that models near-ignorance (thus including the case of the IDM), and for very
general kinds of probabilistic relations between X and S. We show then, by simple
examples, that such a condition is easily satisfied, even in the most elementary and
common statistical problems.
In order to fully appreciate this result, it is important to realize that latent variables
are ubiquitous in problems of uncertainty. The key point here is that the scope of
observational processes greatly extends if we consider that even when we directly
obtain the value of a variable of interest, what we actually obtain is the observation
of the value rather than the value itself. Doing this distinction makes sense because
in practice an observational process is usually imperfect, i.e., there is very often
(it could be argued that there is always) a positive probability of confounding the
realized value of X with another possible value committing thus an observation
error.
Of course, if the probability of an observation error is very small and we consider
one of the common Bayesian model proposed to learn under prior ignorance, then
there is little difference between the results provided by a latent variable model
modeling correctly the observational process, and the results provided by a model
where the observations are assumed to be perfect. For this reason, the observational
1 Elsewhere, this is also called the measurement process.
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process is often neglected in practice and the distinction between the latent variable
and the manifest one is not enforced.
But, on the other hand, if we consider sets of probability distributions to model
our prior beliefs, instead of a single probability distribution, and in particular if we
consider near-ignorance sets of priors, then there can be an extreme difference be-
tween a latent variable model and a model where the observations are considered
to be perfect, so that learning may be impossible in the first model and possible in
the second. As a consequence, when dealing with sets of probability distributions,
neglecting the observational process may be no longer justified even if the proba-
bility of observation error is tiny. This is shown in a definite sense in Example 9
of Section 4.3, where we analyze the relevance of our results for the special case
of the IDM. From the proofs in this paper, it follows that this kind of behavior is
mainly determined by the presence, in the near-ignorance set of priors, of extreme,
almost-deterministic, distributions. And the question is that these problematic dis-
tributions, which are usually not considered when dealing with Bayesian models
with a single prior, cannot be ruled out without dropping near-ignorance.
These considerations highlight the quite general applicability of the present results
and raise hence serious doubts about the possibility to adopt a condition of prior
near-ignorance in real, as opposed to idealized, applications of statistics. As a con-
sequence, it may make sense to consider re-focusing the research about this subject
on developing models of very weak states of belief that are, however, stronger than
near-ignorance. This might also involve dropping the idea that both the symmetry
and the embedding principles can be realistically met in practice.
2 Categorical Latent Variables
In this paper, we follow the general definition of latent and manifest variables given
by Skrondal and Rabe-Hasketh [10]: a latent variable is a random variable whose
realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a manifest variable is a random vari-
able whose realizations can be directly observed.
The concept of latent variable is central in many sciences, like for example psychol-
ogy and medicine. Skrondal and Rabe-Hasketh list several fields of application and
several phenomena that can be modelled using latent variables, and conclude that
latent variable modeling “pervades modern mainstream statistics,” although “this
omni-presence of latent variables is commonly not recognized, perhaps because
latent variables are given different names in different literatures, such as random
effects, common factors and latent classes,” or hidden variables.
But what are latent variables in practice? According to Boorsbom et al. [2], there
may be different interpretations of latent variables. A latent variable can be re-
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garded, for example, as an unobservable random variable that exists independently
of the observation. An example is the unobservable health status of a patient that
is subject to a medical test. Another possibility is to regard a latent variable as
a product of the human mind, a construct that does not exist independently of
the observation. For example the unobservable state of the economy, often used
in economic models. In this paper, we assume the existence of a latent categori-
cal random variable X, with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk} and unknown chances
ϑ ∈ Θ := {ϑ = (ϑ1, . . . , ϑk) | ∑ki=1 ϑi = 1, 0 ≤ ϑi ≤ 1}, without stressing any
particular interpretation. Throughout the paper, we denote by ϑ a particular vector
of chances in Θ and by θ a random variable on Θ.
Now, let us focus on a bounded real-valued function f defined on Θ, where ϑ ∈ Θ
are the unknown chances of X. We aim at learning the value f(ϑ) using n realiza-
tions of the variable X. Because the variable X is latent and therefore unobservable
by definition, the only way to learn f(ϑ) is to observe the realizations of some man-
ifest variable S related, through known probabilities P (S |X), to the (unobservable)
realizations of X. An example of known probabilistic relationship between latent
and manifest variables is the following.
Example 1 Consider a binary medical diagnostic test used to assess the health sta-
tus of a patient with respect to a given disease. The accuracy of a diagnostic test 2
is determined by two probabilities: the sensitivity of a test is the probability of ob-
taining a positive result if the patient is diseased; the specificity is the probability of
obtaining a negative result if the patient is healthy. Medical tests are assumed to be
imperfect indicators of the unobservable true disease status of the patient. There-
fore, we assume that the probability of obtaining a positive result when the patient
is healthy, respectively of obtaining a negative result if the patient is diseased, are
non-zero. Suppose, to make things simpler, that the sensitivity and the specificity
of the test are known. In this example, the unobservable health status of the patient
can be considered as a binary latent variable X with values in the set {Healthy, Ill},
while the result of the test can be considered as a binary manifest variable S with
values in the set {Negative result,Positive result}. Because the sensitivity and the
specificity of the test are known, we know P (S |X). ♦
We continue discussion about this example later on, in the light of our results, in
Example 4 of Section 4.
2 For further details about the modeling of diagnostic accuracy with latent variables see
Yang and Becker [14].
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3 Near-ignorance sets of priors
Consider a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk} and
unknown chancesϑ ∈ Θ. Suppose that we have no relevant prior information about
ϑ and we are therefore in a situation of prior ignorance about X. How should we
model our prior beliefs in order to reflect the initial lack of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models of uncer-
tainty, such as Bayesian probability theory and Walley’s theory of coherent lower
previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modelled using a single prior
probability distribution. The problem of defining a standard prior probability distri-
bution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called non-informative prior,
has been an important research topic in the last two centuries 3 and, despite the nu-
merous contributions, it remains an open research issue, as illustrated by Kass and
Wassermann [6]. See also Hutter [5] for recent developments and complementary
considerations. There are many principles and properties that are desirable when
the focus is on modeling a situation of prior ignorance, and that have indeed been
used in past research to define non-informative priors. For example Laplace’s sym-
metry or indifference principle has suggested, in case of finite possibility spaces,
the use of the uniform distribution. Other principles, like for example the princi-
ple of invariance under group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the
conjugate priors principle, etc., have suggested the use of other non-informative
priors, in particular for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or more of
these principles. But, in general, it has proven to be difficult to define a standard
non-informative prior satisfying, at the same time, all the desirable principles.
We follow Walley [12] and de Cooman and Miranda [3] when they say that there
are at least two principles that should be satisfied to model a situation of prior igno-
rance: the symmetry and the embedding principles. The symmetry principle states
that, if we are ignorant a priori about ϑ, then we have no reason to favour one pos-
sible outcome of X over another, and therefore our probability model on X should
be symmetric. This principle is equivalent to Laplace’s symmetry or indifference
principle. The embedding principle states that, for each possible event A, the prob-
ability assigned to A should not depend on the possibility space X in which A is
embedded. In particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event A should be
invariant with respect to refinements and coarsenings of X .
It is easy to show that the embedding principle is not satisfied by the uniform dis-
tribution. How should we model our prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two
principles? Walley 4 gives what we believe to be a compelling answer to this ques-
3 Starting from the work of Laplace at the beginning of the 19th century [8].
4 In Walley [11], Note 7 at p. 526. See also Section 5.5 of the same book.
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tion: he proves that the only coherent probability model on X consistent with the
two principles is the vacuous probability model, i.e., the model that assigns, for each
non-trivial event A, lower probability P(A) = 0 and upper probability P(A) = 1.
Clearly, the vacuous probability model cannot be expressed using a single probabil-
ity distribution. It follows then, if we agree that the symmetry and the embedding
principles are characteristics of prior ignorance, that we need imprecise probabili-
ties to model such a state of beliefs. 5 Unfortunately, it is easy to show that updating
the vacuous probability model on X produces only vacuous posterior probabilities.
Therefore, the vacuous probability model alone is not a viable way to address our
initial problem. Walley suggests, as an alternative, the use of near-ignorance sets
of priors. 6
A near-ignorance set of priors is a probability model on the chances θ of X, mod-
eling a very weak state of knowledge about θ. In practice, a near-ignorance set of
priors is a large closed convex set M0 of prior probability densities on θ which
produces vacuous expectations for various but not all functions f on Θ, i.e., such
that E(f) = infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and E(f) = supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ).
The key point here is that near-ignorance sets of priors can be designed so as to
satisfy both the symmetry and the embedding principles. In fact, if a near-ignorance
set of priors produces vacuous expectations for all the functions f(ϑ) = ϑi for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then, because a priori P (X = xi) = E(θi), the near-ignorance set
of priors implies the vacuous probability model on X and satisfies therefore both
the symmetry and the embedding principle, thus delivering a satisfactory model
of prior near-ignorance. 7 Updating a near-ignorance prior consists in updating all
the probability densities in M0 using Bayes’ rule. Since the beliefs on θ are not
vacuous, this makes it possible to calculate non-vacuous posterior probabilities for
X.
A good example of near-ignorance set of priors is the setM0 used in the imprecise
Dirichlet model. The IDM models a situation of prior near-ignorance about a cate-
gorical random variable X. The near-ignorance set of priorsM0 used in the IDM
consists of the set of all Dirichlet densities 8 p(ϑ) = dirs,t(ϑ) for a fixed s > 0
and all t ∈ T , where
dirs,t(ϑ) :=
Γ(s)∏k
i=1 Γ(sti)
k∏
i=1
ϑsti−1i , (1)
5 For a complementary point of view, see Hutter [5].
6 Walley calls a set of probability distributions modeling near-ignorance a near-ignorance
prior. In this paper we use the term near-ignorance set of priors in order to avoid confusion
with the precise Bayesian case.
7 We call this state near-ignorance because, although we are completely ignorant a priori
about X, we are not completely ignorant about θ [11, Section 5.3, Note 4].
8 Throughout the paper, if no confusion is possible, we denote the outcome θ = ϑ by ϑ.
For example, we denote p(θ = ϑ) by p(ϑ).
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and
T := {t = (t1, . . . , tk) |
k∑
j=1
tk = 1, 0 < tj < 1}. (2)
The particular choice of M0 in the IDM implies vacuous prior expectations for
all the functions f(ϑ) = ϑRi , for all integers R ≥ 1 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i.e.,
E(θRi ) = 0 and E(θ
R
i ) = 1. Choosing R = 1, we have, a priori,
P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 0, P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 1.
It follows that the particular near-ignorance set of priorsM0 used in the IDM im-
plies a priori the vacuous probability model on X and, therefore, satisfies both the
symmetry and embedding principles. On the other hand, the particular set of priors
used in the IDM does not imply vacuous prior expectations for all the functions
f(ϑ). For example, vacuous expectations for the functions f(ϑ) = ϑi ·ϑj for i 6= j
would be E(ϑi · ϑj) = 0 and E(ϑi · ϑj) = 0.25, but in the IDM we have a priori
E(ϑi · ϑj) < 0.25 and the prior expectations are therefore not vacuous. In Walley
[12], it is shown that the IDM produces, for each observed dataset, non-vacuous
posterior probabilities for X.
4 Limits of Learning under Prior Near-Ignorance
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) categorical la-
tent variables (Xi)i∈N with outcomes in X and unknown chances θ, and a sequence
of independent manifest variables (Si)i∈N, which we allow to be defined either on
finite or infinite spaces. We assume that a realization of the manifest variable Si can
be observed only after a (hidden) realization of the latent variable Xi. Furthermore,
we assume Si to be independent of the chances θ of Xi conditional on Xi, i.e.,
P (Si |Xi = xj,θ = ϑ) = P (Si |Xi = xj), (3)
for each xj ∈ X and ϑ ∈ Θ. 9 These assumptions model a two-step process where
the variable Si is used to convey information about the realized value of Xi for each
i, independently of the chances of Xi. The (in)dependence structure can be depicted
graphically as follows,
θ Xi Si- -
where the framed part of this structure is what we call an observational process.
9 We denote usually by P a probability (discrete case) and with p a probability density
(continuous case). If an expression holds in both the discrete and the continuous case, like
for example Equation (3), then we use P to indicate both cases.
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To make things simpler, we assume the probability distribution P (Si |Xi = xj) to
be precise and known for each xj ∈ X and each i ∈ N.
We divide the discussion about the limits of learning under prior near-ignorance in
three subsections. In Section 4.1 we discuss our general parametric problem and we
obtain a condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place. In Section 4.2 we
study the consequences of our theoretical results in the particular case of predictive
probabilities. Finally, in Section 4.3, we focus on the particular near-ignorance set
of priors used in the IDM and we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for
learning with categorical manifest variables.
4.1 General parametric inference
We focus on a very general problem of parametric inference. Suppose that we ob-
serve a dataset s of realizations of the manifest variables S1, . . . , Sn related to the
(unobservable) dataset x ∈ X n of realizations of the variables X1, . . . ,Xn. Defin-
ing the random variables X := (X1, . . . ,Xn) and S := (S1, . . . , Sn), we have
S = s and X = x. To simplify notation, when no confusion can arise, we denote
in the rest of the paper S = s with s. Given a bounded function f(ϑ), our aim is
to calculate E(f | s) and E(f | s) starting from a condition of ignorance about f ,
i.e., using a near ignorance priorM0, such that E(f) = fmin := infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ) and
E(f) = fmax := supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ).
Is it really possible to learn something about the function f , starting from a condi-
tion of prior near-ignorance and having observed a dataset s? The following theo-
rem shows that, very often, this is not the case. In particular, Corollary 3 shows that
there is a condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place.
Theorem 2 Let s be given. Consider a bounded continuous function f defined on
Θ and a near-ignorance set of priorsM0. Then the following statements hold. 10
(1) If the likelihood function P(s |ϑ) is strictly positive 11 in each point in which
f reaches its maximum value fmax, is continuous in an arbitrary small neigh-
borhood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori E(f) = fmax, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax.
10 The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix, together with all the other proofs of
the paper.
11 In the appendix it is shown that the assumptions of positivity of P(s |ϑ) in Theorem 2
can be substituted by the following weaker assumptions. For a given arbitrary small δ > 0,
denote by Θδ the measurable set, Θδ := {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≥ fmax − δ}. If P(s |ϑ) is such
that, limδ→0 infϑ∈Θδ P(s |ϑ) = c > 0, then Statement 1 of Theorem 2 holds. The same
holds for the second statement, substituting Θδ with Θ˜δ := {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≤ fmin + δ}.
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(2) If the likelihood function P(s |ϑ) is strictly positive in each point in which f
reaches its minimum value fmin, is continuous in an arbitrary small neighbor-
hood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori E(f) = fmin, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin.
Corollary 3 Consider a near-ignorance set of priors M0. Let s be given and let
P(s |ϑ) be a continuous strictly positive function on Θ. IfM0 is such that E(f) =
fmin and E(f) = fmax, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin,
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax.
In other words, given s, if the likelihood function is strictly positive, then the func-
tions f that, according to M0, have vacuous expectations a priori, have vacuous
expectations also a posteriori, after having observed s. It follows that, if this suf-
ficient condition is satisfied, we cannot use near-ignorance priors to model a state
of prior ignorance because only vacuous posterior expectations are produced. The
sufficient condition described above is met very easily in practice, as shown in the
following two examples. In the first example, we consider a very simple setting
where the manifest variables are categorical. In the second example, we consider
a simple setting with continuous manifest variables. We show that, in both cases,
the sufficient condition is satisfied and therefore we are unable to learn under prior
near-ignorance.
Example 4 Consider the medical test introduced in Example 1 and an (ideally)
infinite population of individuals. Denote by the binary variable Xi ∈ {H, I} the
health status of the i-th individual of the population and with Si ∈ {+,−} the
results of the diagnostic test applied to the same individual. We assume that the
variables in the sequence (Xi)i∈N are IID with unknown chances (ϑ, 1−ϑ), where ϑ
corresponds to the (unknown) proportion of diseased individuals in the population.
Denote by 1 − ε1 the specificity and with 1 − ε2 the sensitivity of the test. Then it
holds that
P(Si = + |Xi = H) = ε1 > 0, P(Si = − |Xi = I) = ε2 > 0,
where (I,H,+,−) denote (patient ill, patient healthy, test positive, test negative).
Suppose that we observe the results of the test applied to n different individuals of
the population; using our previous notation we have S = s. For each individual we
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have,
P(Si = + |ϑ)
=P(Si = + |Xi = I)P(Xi = I |ϑ) + P(Si = + |Xi = H)P(Xi = H |ϑ)
= (1− ε2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·ϑ+ ε1︸︷︷︸
>0
·(1− ϑ) > 0.
Analogously,
P(Si = − |ϑ)
=P(Si = − |Xi = I)P(Xi = I |ϑ) + P(Si = − |Xi = H)P(Xi = H |ϑ)
= ε2︸︷︷︸
>0
·ϑ+ (1− ε1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(1− ϑ) > 0.
Denote by ns the number of positive tests in the observed sample s. Since the
variables Si are independent, we have
P(S = s |ϑ) = ((1− ε2) · ϑ+ ε1 · (1− ϑ))ns · (ε2 · ϑ+ (1− ε1) · (1− ϑ))n−ns > 0
for each ϑ ∈ [0, 1] and each s ∈ X n. Therefore, according to Corollary 3, all the
functions f that, according toM0, have vacuous expectations a priori have vacuous
expectations also a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior
expectations, then we cannot model our prior knowledge (ignorance) using a near-
ignorance set of priors. This simple example shows that our previous theoretical
results raise serious questions about the use of near-ignorance sets of priors also in
very simple, common, and important situations. ♦
Example 4 focuses on categorical latent and manifest variables. In the next exam-
ple, we show that our theoretical results have important implications also in models
with categorical latent variables and continuous manifest variables.
Example 5 Consider a sequence of IID categorical variables (Xi)i∈N with out-
comes in X n and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that, for each i ≥ 1, after a
realization of the latent variable Xi, we can observe a realization of a continuous
manifest variable Si. Assume that p(Si |Xi = xj) is a continuous positive probabil-
ity density, e.g., a normal N(µj, σ2j ) density, for each xj ∈ X . We have
p(Si |ϑ) =
∑
xj∈X
p(Si |Xi = xj) · P(Xi = xj |ϑ) =
∑
xj∈X
p(Si |Xi = xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·ϑj > 0,
because ϑj is positive for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and we have assumed Si to be
independent of θ given Xi. Because we have assumed (Si)i∈N to be a sequence of
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independent variables, we have
p(S = s |ϑ) =
n∏
i=1
p(Si = si |ϑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Therefore, according to Corollary 3, if we model our prior knowledge using a near-
ignorance set of priorsM0, the vacuous prior expectations implied byM0 remain
vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior ex-
pectations, we cannot model our prior knowledge using a near-ignorance set of
priors. ♦
Examples 4 and 5 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use of near-ignorance
sets of priors in real applications.
4.2 An important special case: predictive probabilities
We focus now on a very important special case: that of predictive inference. 12 Sup-
pose that our aim is to predict the outcomes of the next n′ variables Xn+1, . . . ,Xn+n′ .
Let X′ := (Xn+1, . . . ,Xn+n′). If no confusion is possible, we denote X′ = x′ by
x′. Given x′ ∈ X n′ , our aim is to calculate P(x′ | s) and P(x′ | s). Modeling our
prior ignorance about the parameters θ with a near-ignorance set of priorsM0 and
denoting by n′ := (n′1, . . . , n
′
k) the frequencies of the dataset x
′, we have
P(x′ | s) = inf
p∈M0
Pp(x
′ | s) = inf
p∈M0
∫
Θ
k∏
i=1
ϑ
n′i
i p(ϑ | s)dϑ =
= inf
p∈M0
Ep
(
k∏
i=1
ϑ
n′i
i | s
)
= E
(
k∏
i=1
ϑ
n′i
i | s
)
,
(4)
where, according to Bayes’ rule,
p(ϑ | s) = P(s |ϑ)p(ϑ)∫
Θ P(s |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ
,
provided that
∫
Θ P(s |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ 6= 0. Analogously, substituting sup to inf in (4),
we obtain
P(x′ | s) = E
(
k∏
i=1
ϑ
n′i
i | s
)
. (5)
12 For a general presentation of predictive inference see Geisser [4]; for a discussion of the
imprecise probability approach to predictive inference see Walley and Bernard [13].
12
Therefore, the lower and upper probabilities assigned to the dataset x′ a priori (a
posteriori) correspond to the prior (posterior) lower and upper expectations of the
continuous bounded function f(ϑ) =
∏k
i=1 ϑ
n′i
i .
It is easy to show that, in this case, the minimum of f is 0 and is reached in all
the points ϑ ∈ Θ with ϑi = 0 for some i such that n′i > 0, while the maximum
of f is reached in a single point of Θ corresponding to the relative frequencies f ′
of the sample x′, i.e., at f ′ =
(
n′1
n′ , . . . ,
n′k
n′
)
∈ Θ, and the maximum of f is given
by
∏k
i=1
(
n′i
n′
)n′i . It follows that the maximally imprecise probabilities regarding the
dataset x′, given that x′ has been generated by a multinomial process, are given by
P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
= 0, P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
=
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
n′
)n′i
.
The general results stated in Section 4.1 hold also in the particular case of predictive
probabilities. In particular, Corollary 3 can be rewritten as follows.
Corollary 6 Consider a near-ignorance set of priors M0. Let s be given and let
P(s |ϑ) be a continuous strictly positive function on Θ. Then, ifM0 implies prior
probabilities for a dataset x′ ∈ X n′ that are maximally imprecise, the predictive
probabilities of x′ are maximally imprecise also a posteriori, after having observed
s, i.e.,
P(x′ | s) = P(x′) = 0, P(x′ | s) = P(x′) =
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
n′
)n′i
.
4.3 Predicting the next outcome with categorical manifest variables
In this section we consider a special case for which we give necessary and sufficient
conditions to learn under prior near-ignorance. These conditions are then used to
analyze the IDM.
We assume that all the manifest variables in S are categorical. Given an arbitrary
categorical manifest variable Si, denote by S i := {s1, . . . , sni} the finite set of pos-
sible outcomes of Si. The probabilities of Si are defined conditional on the realized
value of Xi and are given by
λhj(Si) := P (Si = sh |Xi = xj),
where h ∈ {1, . . . , ni} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The probabilities of Si can be collected
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in a ni × k stochastic matrix ΛSi defined by
Λ(Si) :=

λ11(Si) . . . λ1k(Si)
... . . .
...
λni1(Si) . . . λnik(Si)
 ,
which is called emission matrix of Si.
Our aim, given s, is to predict the next (latent) outcome starting from prior near-
ignorance. In other words, our aim is to calculate P(Xn+1 = xj | s) and P(Xn+1 =
xj | s) for each xj ∈ X , using a set of priorsM0 such that P(Xn+1 = xj) = 0 and
P(Xn+1 = xj) = 1 for each xj ∈ X .
A possible near-ignorance set of priors for this problem is the set M0 used in
the IDM. We have seen, in Section 3, that this particular near-ignorance set of
priors is such that P(Xn+1 = xj) = 0 and P(Xn+1 = xj) = 1 for each xj ∈ X .
For this particular choice, the following theorem 13 states necessary and sufficient
conditions for learning.
Theorem 7 Let Λ(Si) be the emission matrix of Si for i = 1, . . . , n. LetM0 be the
near-ignorance set of priors used in the IDM. Given an arbitrary observed dataset
s, we obtain a posteriori the following inferences.
1. If all the elements of matrices Λ(Si) are nonzero, then, P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = 1,
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = 0, for every xj ∈ X .
2. P (Xn+1 = xj | s) < 1 for some xj ∈ X , iff we observed at least one manifest
variable Si = sh such that λhj(Si) = 0.
3. P (Xn+1 = xj | s) > 0 for some xj ∈ X , iff we observed at least one manifest
variable Si = sh such that λhj(Si) 6= 0 and λhr(Si) = 0 for each r 6= j in
{1, . . . , k}.
In other words, to avoid vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next out-
come, we need at least a partial perfection of the observational process. Some sim-
ple criteria to recognize settings producing vacuous inferences are the following.
Corollary 8 Under the assumptions of Theorem 7, the following criteria hold:
1. If the j-th columns of matrices Λ(Si) have all nonzero elements, then, for each
s, P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = 1.
2. If the j-th rows of matrices Λ(Si) have more than one nonzero element, then,
for each s, P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = 0.
Example 9 Consider again the medical test of Example 4. The manifest variable
13 Theorem 7 is a slightly extended version of Theorem 1 in Piatti et al. [9].
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Si (the result of the medical test applied to the i-th individual) is a binary variable
with outcomes positive (+) or negative (−). The underlying latent variable Xi (the
health status of the i-th individual) is also a binary variable, with outcomes ill (I)
or healthy (H). The emission matrix in this case is the same for each i ∈ N and is
the 2× 2 matrix,
Λ =
 1− ε2 ε1
ε2 1− ε1
 .
All the elements of Λ are different from zero. Therefore, using as set of priors the
near-ignorance set of priorsM0 of the IDM, according to Theorem 7, we are unable
to move away from the initial state of ignorance. This result confirms, in the case
of the near-ignorance set of priors of the IDM, the general result of Example 4.
It is interesting to remark that it is impossible to learn for arbitrarily small values
of ε1 and ε2, provided that they are positive. It follows that there are situations
where the observational process cannot be neglected, even when we deem it to be
imperfect with tiny probability. This point is particulary interesting when compared
to what would be obtained using a model with a single non-informative prior. In
this case, the difference between a model with perfect observations and a model
that takes into account the probability or error would be very small and therefore
the former model would be used instead of the latter. Our results show that this
procedure, that is almost an automatism when using models with a single prior,
may not be justified in models with sets of priors. The point here seems to be that
the amount of imperfection of the observational process should not be evaluated in
absolute terms; it should rather be evaluated in comparison with the weakness of
the prior beliefs.
♦
The previous example has been concerned with the case in which the IDM is ap-
plied to a latent categorical variable. Now we focus on the original setup for which
the IDM was conceived, where there are no latent variables. In this case, it is well
known that the IDM leads to non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the
next outcome. In the next example, we show how such a setup makes the IDM
avoid the theoretical limitations stated in Section 4.1.
Example 10 In the IDM, we assume that the IID categorical variables (Xi)i∈N
are observable. In other words, we have Si = Xi for each i ≥ 1 and therefore
the IDM is not a latent variable model. The IDM is equivalent to a model with
categorical manifest variables and emission matrices equal to the identity matrix I .
Therefore, according to the second and third statements of Theorem 7, if x contains
only observations of the type xj , then
P(Xn+1 = xj |x) > 0 ,P(Xn+1 = xj |x) = 1,
P(Xn+1 = xh |x) = 0 ,P(Xn+1 = xh |x) < 1,
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for each h 6= j. Otherwise, for all the other possible observed dataset x,
P(Xn+1 = xj |x) > 0 ,P(Xn+1 = xj |x) < 1 ,
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. It follows that, in general, the IDM produces, for each
observed dataset x, non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next out-
come.
The IDM avoids the theoretical limitations highlighted in Section 4.1 thanks to its
particular likelihood function. Having observed S = X = x, we have
P(S = x |ϑ) = P(X = x |ϑ) =
k∏
i=1
ϑnii ,
where ni denotes the number of times that xi ∈ X has been observed in x. We have
P(X = x |ϑ) = 0 for all ϑ such that ϑj = 0 for at least one j such that nj > 0 and
P(X = x |ϑ) > 0 for all the other ϑ ∈ Θ, in particular for all ϑ in the interior of
Θ.
Consider, to make things simpler, that in x at least two different outcomes have been
observed. The posterior predictive probabilities for the next outcome are obtained
calculating the lower and upper expectations of the function f(ϑ) = ϑj for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This function reaches its minimum (fmin = 0) if ϑj = 0 and its
maximum (fmin = 1) if ϑj = 1. Therefore, the points where the function f(ϑ) = ϑj
reaches its minimum, resp. its maximum, are on the boundary of Θ and it is easy
to show that the likelihood function equals zero at least in one of these points. It
follows that the positivity assumptions of Theorem 2 are not met. ♦
Example 10 shows that we are able to learn, using a near-ignorance set of priors,
only if the likelihood function P(s |ϑ) is equal to zero in some critical points. The
likelihood function of the IDM is very peculiar, being in general equal to zero on
some parts of the boundary of Θ, and allows therefore to use a near-ignorance
set of priors M0 that models in a satisfactory way a condition of prior (near-)
ignorance. 14
Yet, since the variables (Xi)i∈N are assumed to be observable, the successful appli-
cation of a near-ignorance set of priors in the IDM is not helpful in addressing the
doubts raised by our theoretical results about the applicability of near-ignorance set
of priors in situations, where the variables (Xi)i∈N are latent, as shown in Exam-
ple 9.
14 See Walley [12] and Bernard [1] for an in-depth discussion on the properties of the IDM.
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5 On modeling observable quantities
In this section, we discuss three alternative approaches that, at a first sight, might
seem promising to overcome the problem of learning under prior near-ignorance.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the particular problem of calculating pre-
dictive probabilities for the next outcome and a very simple setting based on the
IDM. The alternative approaches are based on trying to predict the manifest vari-
able rather than the latent one, thus changing perspective with respect to the previ-
ous sections. This change of perspective is useful to consider also because on some
occasions, e.g., when the imperfection of the observational process is considered to
be low, one may deem sufficient to focus on predicting the manifest variable. We
show, however, that the proposed approaches eventually do not solve the mentioned
learning question, which remains therefore an open problem.
Let us introduce in detail the simple setting we are going to use. Consider a se-
quence of independent and identically distributed categorical binary latent vari-
ables (Xi)i∈N with unknown chances θ = (θ1, θ2) = (θ1, 1 − θ1), and a sequence
of IID binary manifest variables (Si)i∈N with the same possible outcomes. Since
the manifest variables are also IID, then they can be regarded as the product of
an overall multinomial data-generating process (that includes the generation of
the latent variables as well as the observational process) with unknown chances
ξ := (ξ1, ξ2) = (ξ1, 1− ξ1). Suppose that the emission matrix Λ is known, constant
for each i and strictly diagonally dominant, i.e.,
Λ =
 1− ε2 ε1
ε2 1− ε1
 ,
with ε1, ε2 6= 0, ε1 < 0.5 and ε2 < 0.5. This simple matrix models the case in
which, for each i, we are observing the outcomes of the random variable Xi but
there is a positive probability of confounding the actual outcome of Xi with the
other one. The random variable Si represents our observation, while Xi represents
the true value. A typical example for this kind of situation is the medical example
discussed in Examples 4 and 9. Suppose that we have observed S = s and our aim
is to calculate P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Xn+1 = x1 | s).
In the previous sections we have dealt with this problem by modeling our ignorance
about the chances of Xn+1 with a near-ignorance set of priors and then calculating
P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Xn+1 = x1 | s). But we already know from Example 4 that
in this case we obtain vacuous predictive probabilities, i.e.,
P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) = 0, P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) = 1.
Because this approach does not produce any useful result, one could be tempted
to modify it in order to obtain non-vacuous predictive probabilities for the next
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outcome. We have identified three possible alternative approaches that we discuss
below. The basic structure of the three approaches is identical and is based on the
idea of focusing on the manifest variables, that are observable, instead of the latent
variables. The proposed structure is the following:
• specify a near-ignorance set of priors for the chances ξ of Sn+1;
• construct predictive probabilities for the manifest variables, i.e.,
P(Sn+1 = x1 | s), P(Sn+1 = x1 | s);
• use the predictive probabilities calculated in the previous point to say something
about the predictive probabilities
P(Xn+1 = x1 | s), P(Xn+1 = x1 | s).
The three approaches differ in the specification of the near-ignorance set of priors
for ξ and on the way P(Sn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Sn+1 = x1 | s) are used to reconstruct
P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Xn+1 = x1 | s).
The first approach consists in specifying a near-ignorance set of priors for the
chances ξ taking into consideration the fact that these chances are related to the
chances θ through the equation
ξ1 = (1− ε2) · θ1 + ε1 · (1− θ1),
and therefore we have ξ1 ∈ [ε1, 1− ε2]. A possible way to specify correctly a near-
ignorance set of priors in this case is to consider the near-ignorance set of priorsM0
of the IDM on θ, consisting of standard beta(s, t) distributions, and to substitute
θ1 =
ξ1 − ε1
1− (ε1 + ε2) , dθ1 =
dξ1
1− (ε1 + ε2) ,
into all the prior distributions inM0. We obtain thus a near-ignorance set of priors
for ξ consisting of beta distributions scaled on the set [ε1, 1− ε2], i.e.,
ξ1 ∼ C
1− (ε1 + ε2)
(
ξ1 − ε1
1− (ε1 + ε2)
)st1−1 ((1− ξ1)− ε2
1− (ε1 + ε2)
)st2−1
,
where C := Γ(s)
Γ(st1)Γ(st2)
. But, scaling the distributions, we incur the same problem
we have incurred with the IDM for the latent variable. Suppose that we have ob-
served a dataset s containing n1 times the outcome x1 and n−n1 times the outcome
x2. The likelihood function in this case is given by L(ξ1, ξ2) = ξn11 · (1− ξ1)(n−n1).
Because ξ1 ∈ [ε1, 1 − ε2] the likelihood functions is always positive and therefore
the extreme distributions that are present in the near-ignorance set of priors for ξ
produce vacuous expectations for ξ1, i.e., E(ξ1 | s) = 1 − ε2 and E(ξ1 | s) = ε1.
It follows that this approach does not solve our theoretical problem. Moreover, it
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follows that the inability to learn is present under near-ignorance even when we
focus on predicting the manifest variable!
The second, more naive, approach consists in using the near-ignorance set of priors
M0 used in the standard IDM to model ignorance about ξ. In this way we are
assuming (wrongly) that ξ1 ∈ [0, 1], ignoring thus the fact that ξ1 ∈ [ε1, 1 − ε2]
and therefore implicitly ignoring the emission matrix Λ. Applying the standard
IDM on ξ we are able to produce non-vacuous probabilities P(Sn+1 = x1 | s) and
P(Sn+1 = x1 | s). Now, because Λ is known, knowing the value of P (Sn+1 = x1 | s)
it is possible to reconstruct P (Xn+1 = x1 | s). But this approach, that on one hand
ignores Λ and on the other hand takes it into consideration, is clearly wrong. For
example, it can be easily shown that it can produce probabilities outside [0, 1].
Finally, a third possible approach could be to neglect the existence of the latent
level and consider Sn+1 to be the variable of interest. Applying the standard IDM
on the manifest variables we are clearly able to produce non vacuous probabilities
P(Sn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Sn+1 = x1 | s) that are then simply used instead of the
probabilities P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) and P(Xn+1 = x1 | s) in the problem of interest.
This approach is the one typically followed by those who apply the IDM in practical
problems. 15 This approach requires the user to assume perfect observability; an
assumption that appears to be incorrect in most (if not all) real statistical problems.
And yet this procedure, despite being wrong or hardly justifiable from a theoretical
point of view, has produced in several applications of the IDM useful results, at least
from an empirical point of view. This paradox between our theoretical results and
the current practice is an open problem that deserves to be investigated in further
research.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proved a sufficient condition that prevents learning about a
latent categorical variable to take place under prior near-ignorance regarding the
data-generating process.
The condition holds as soon as the likelihood is strictly positive (and continuous),
and so is satisfied frequently, even in the more common and simple settings. Tak-
ing into account that the considered framework is very general and pervasive of
statistical practice, we regard this result as a form of strong evidence against the
possibility to use prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems. Given also that
prior near-ignorance is arguably a privileged way to model a state of ignorance, our
results appear to substantially reduce the hope to be able to adopt a form of prior
ignorance to do objective-minded statistical inference.
15 See Bernard [1] for a list of applications of the IDM.
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With respect to future research, two possible research directions seem to be partic-
ularly important to investigate.
As reported by Bernard [1], near-ignorance sets of priors, in the specific form of the
IDM, have been successfully used in a number of applications. On the other hand,
the theoretical results presented in this paper point to the impossibility of learning in
real statistical problems when starting from a state of near-ignorance. This paradox
between empirical and theoretical results should be investigated in order to better
understand the practical relevance of the theoretical analysis presented here, and
more generally to explain the mechanism behind such an apparent contradiction.
The proofs contained in this paper suggest that the impossibility of learning under
prior near-ignorance with latent variables is mainly due to the presence, in the set
of priors, of extreme distributions arbitrarily close to the deterministic ones. Some
preliminary experimental analyses have shown that learning is possible as soon as
one restricts the set of priors so as to rule out the extreme distributions. This can
be realized by defining a notion of distance between priors and then by allowing a
distribution to enter the prior set of probability distributions only if it is at least a
certain positive distance away from the deterministic priors. The minimal distance
can be chosen arbitrarily small (while remaining positive), and this allows one to
model a state of very weak beliefs, close to near-ignorance. Such a weak state of
beliefs could keep some of the advantages of near-ignorance (although it would
clearly not be a model of ignorance) while permitting learning to take place. The
main problem of this approach is the justification, i.e., the interpretation of the
(arbitrary) restriction of the near-ignorance set of priors. A way to address this issue
might be to identify a set of desirable principles, possibly similar to the symmetry
and embedding principles, leading in a natural way to a suitably large set of priors
describing a state close to near-ignorance.
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A Technical preliminaries
In this appendix we prove some technical results that are used to prove the theorems
in the paper. First of all, we introduce some notation used in this appendix. Consider
a sequence of probability densities (pn)n∈N and a function f defined on a set Θ.
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Then we use the notation
En(f) :=
∫
Θ
f(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ, Pn(Θ˜) :=
∫
Θ˜
pn(ϑ)dϑ, Θ˜ ⊆ Θ,
and with→ we denote limn→∞.
Theorem 11 Let Θ ⊂ Rk be the closed k-dimensional simplex and let (pn)n∈N
be a sequence of probability densities defined on Θ w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.
Let f ≥ 0 be a bounded continuous function on Θ and let fmax := supΘ(f) and
fmin := infΘ(f). For this function define the measurable sets
Θδ = {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≥ fmax − δ}, (A.1)
Θ˜δ = {ϑ ∈ Θ | f(ϑ) ≤ fmin + δ}. (A.2)
(1) Assume that (pn)n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n → ∞, in the
sense that
En(f)→ fmax, (A.3)
then, for all δ > 0, it holds
Pn(Θδ)→ 1.
(2) Assume that (pn)n∈N concentrates on a minimum of f for n → ∞, in the
sense that
En(f)→ fmin, (A.4)
then, for all δ > 0, it holds
Pn(Θ˜δ)→ 1.
Proof. We begin by proving the first statement. Let δ > 0 be arbitrary and Θ¯δ :=
Θ \ Θδ. From (A.1) we know that on Θδ it holds f(ϑ) ≥ fmax − δ, and therefore
on Θ¯δ we have f(ϑ) ≤ fmax − δ, and thus
fmax − f(ϑ)
δ
≥ 1. (A.5)
It follows that
1− Pn(Θδ) = Pn(Θ¯δ) =
∫
Θ¯δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ
(A.5)
≤
∫
Θ¯δ
fmax − f(ϑ)
δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ
≤
∫
Θ
fmax − f(ϑ)
δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ =
1
δ
(fmax − En(f)) (A.3)−→ 0,
and therefore Pn(Θδ) → 1 and thus the first statement is proved. To prove the
second statement, let δ > 0 be arbitrary and Θ̂δ := Θ \ Θ˜δ. From (A.2) we know
that on Θ˜δ it holds f(ϑ) ≤ fmin + δ, and therefore on Θ̂δ we have f(ϑ) ≥ fmin + δ,
and thus
f(ϑ)− fmin
δ
≥ 1. (A.6)
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It follows that
1− Pn(Θ˜δ) = Pn(Θ̂δ) =
∫
Θ̂δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ
(A.6)
≤
∫
Θ̂δ
f(ϑ)− fmin
δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ
≤
∫
Θ
f(ϑ)− fmin
δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ =
1
δ
(En(f)− fmin) (A.3)−→ 0,
and therefore Pn(Θ˜δ)→ 1. 2
Theorem 12 Let L(ϑ) ≥ 0 be a bounded measurable function and suppose that
the assumptions of Theorem 11 hold. Then the following two statements hold.
(1) If the function L(ϑ) is such that
c := lim
δ→0
inf
ϑ∈Θδ
L(ϑ) > 0, (A.7)
and (pn)n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n→∞, then
En(Lf)
En(L)
=
∫
Θ f(ϑ)L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ∫
Θ L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ
→ fmax. (A.8)
(2) If the function L(ϑ) is such that
c := lim
δ→0
inf
ϑ∈Θ˜δ
L(ϑ) > 0, (A.9)
and (pn)n∈N concentrates on a minimum of f for n→∞, then
En(Lf)
En(L)
−→ fmin. (A.10)
Remark 13 If L is strictly positive in each point in Θ where the function f reaches
its maximum, resp. minimum, and is continuous in an arbitrary small neighborhood
of those points, then (A.7), resp. (A.9), are satisfied.
Proof. We begin by proving the first statement of the theorem. Fix ε and δ arbitrarily
small, but δ small enough such that infϑ∈Θδ L(ϑ) ≥ c2 . denote by Lmax the supre-
mum of the function L(ϑ) in Θ. From Theorem 11, we know that Pn(Θδ) ≥ 1− ε,
for n sufficiently large. This implies, for n sufficiently large,
En(L) =
∫
Θ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ ≥
∫
Θδ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ ≥ c
2
(1− ε), (A.11)
En(Lf) ≤ En(Lfmax) = fmaxEn(L), (A.12)
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En(L) =
∫
Θ¯δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ+
∫
Θδ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ
≤Lmax
∫
Θ¯δ
pn(ϑ)dϑ+
∫
Θδ
f(ϑ)
fmax − δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1 on Θδ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ
≤Lmax · ε+ 1
fmax − δEn(Lf). (A.13)
Combining (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), we have
fmax ≥ En(Lf)
En(L)
≥ (fmax − δ)En(L)− Lmax · ε
En(L)
≥ (fmax − δ)
(
1− Lmax · εc
2
(1− ε)
)
.
Since the right-hand side of the last inequality tends to fmax for δ, ε→ 0, and both
δ, ε can be chosen arbitrarily small, we have
En(Lf)
En(L)
→ fmax.
To prove the second statement of the theorem, fix ε and δ arbitrarily small, but
δ small enough such that inf
ϑ∈Θ˜δ L(ϑ) ≥ c2 . From Theorem 11, we know that
Pn(Θ˜δ) ≥ 1 − ε, for n sufficiently large and therefore Pn(Θ̂δ) ≤ ε. This implies,
for n sufficiently large,
En(L) =
∫
Θ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ ≥
∫
Θ˜δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ ≥ c
2
(1− ε), (A.14)
En(Lf) ≥ En(Lfmin) = fminEn(L)⇒ fmin ≤ En(Lf)
En(L)
. (A.15)
Define the function
K(ϑ) :=
(
1− f(ϑ)
fmin + δ
)
L(ϑ).
By definition, the function K is negative on Θ̂δ and is bounded. denote by Kmin the
(negative) minimum of K. We have
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En(L) =
∫
Θ̂δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ+
∫
Θ˜δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ
≥
∫
Θ̂δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ+
∫
Θ˜δ
f(ϑ)
fmin + δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1 on Θ˜δ
L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ
=
∫
Θ̂δ
(
L(ϑ)− f(ϑ)
fmin + δ
L(ϑ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K(ϑ)
pn(ϑ)dϑ+
1
fmin + δ
∫
Θ
f(ϑ)L(ϑ)pn(ϑ)dϑ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=En(Lf)
≥Kmin · Pn(Θ̂δ) + 1
fmin + δ
· En(Lf).
It follows that (
En(L)−Kmin · Pn(Θ̂δ)
)
(fmin + δ) ≥ En(Lf),
and thus, combining the last inequality with (A.14) and (A.15), we obtain
fmin ≤ En(Lf)
En(L)
≤ (fmin + δ)
(
1 +
|Kmin| · Pn(Θ̂δ)
En(L)
)
≤ (fmin + δ)
(
1 +
|Kmin| · ε
c
2
(1− ε)
)
.
Since the right-hand side of the last inequality tends to fmin for δ, ε → 0, and both
δ, ε can be chosen arbitrarily small, we have
En(Lf)
En(L)
→ fmin. 2
B Proofs of the main results
Proof of Theorem 2 Define, fmin := infϑ∈Θ f(ϑ), fmax := supϑ∈Θ f(ϑ), and
define the bounded non-negative function f˜(ϑ) := f(ϑ) − fmin ≥ 0. We have,
f˜max = fmax − fmin. IfM0 is such that a priori, E(f) = fmax, then we have also
that E(f˜) = f˜max, because,
E(f˜) = sup
p∈M0
Ep(f−fmin) = sup
p∈M0
Ep(f)−fmin = E(f)−fmin = fmax−fmin = f˜max.
Then, it is possible to define a sequence (pn)n∈N ⊂ M0 such that En(f˜) → f˜max.
According to Theorem 12, substituting L(ϑ) with P(s |ϑ) in (A.8), we see that
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En(f˜ | s)→ f˜max = E(f˜) and therefore E(f˜ | s) = E(f˜), from which follows that,
E(f | s)− fmin = E(f)− fmin = fmax − fmin.
We can conclude that, E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax. In the same way, substituting E to
E, we can prove that E(f | s) = E(f) = fmin. 2
Corollary 3 is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 7 To prove Theorem 7 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Consider a dataset x with frequencies a = (ax1 , . . . , axk). Then, the fol-
lowing equality holds,
k∏
h=1
ϑ
axh
h · dirs,t(ϑ) =
∏k
h=1 ·
∏axh
j=1(sth + j − 1)∏n
j=1(s+ j − 1)
· dirsx,tx(ϑ),
where sx := n+ s and txh :=
axh+sth
n+s
. When axh = 0, we set
∏0
j=1(sth + j − 1) := 1
by definition.
A proof of Lemma 14 is in [9]. Because P(x |ϑ) = ∏kh=1 ϑaxhh , according to Bayes’
rule, we have p(ϑ |x) = dirsx,tx(ϑ) and
P (x) =
∏k
h=1
∏axh
l=1(sth + l − 1)∏n
l=1(s+ l − 1)
. (B.1)
Given a Dirichlet distribution dirs,t(ϑ), the expected valueE(ϑj) is given byE(ϑj) =
tj (see [7]). It follows that
E(ϑj |x) = txj =
axj + stj
n+ s
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 7.
1. The first statement of Theorem 7 is a consequence of Corollary 6. Because Si is
independent of ϑ given Xi for each i ∈ N, we have
P(s |x,ϑ) = P(s |x), (B.2)
and therefore, using (B.2) and Bayes’ rule, we obtain the likelihood function,
L(ϑ) = P (s |ϑ) = ∑
x∈Xn
P (s |x) · P (x |ϑ) = ∑
x∈Xn
P (s |x) ·
k∏
h=1
ϑ
axh
h . (B.3)
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Because all the elements of the matrices ΛSi are nonzero, we have P (s |x) > 0,
for each s and each x ∈ X n. For each ϑ ∈ Θ, there is at least one x ∈ X n such
that
∏k
h=1 ϑ
axh
h > 0. It follows that,
L(ϑ) =
∑
x∈Xn
P (s |x) ·
k∏
j=1
ϑ
axj
j > 0,
for each ϑ ∈ Θ and therefore, according to Corollary 6 with n′ = 1, the predic-
tive probabilities that are vacuous a priori remain vacuous also a posteriori.
2. We have P(Xn+1 = xj | s) = E(ϑj | s), and therefore, according to Lemma 14
and Bayes’ rule,
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) =
∫
Θ ϑjP (s |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ∫
Θ P (s |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ
=
(B.2)
=
∑
x∈Xn
∫
Θ ϑjP (s |x)P (x |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ∑
x∈Xn
∫
Θ P (s |x)P (x |ϑ)p(ϑ)dϑ
=
=
∑
x∈Xn P (s |x)P (x)
∫
Θ ϑjp(ϑ |x)dϑ∑
x∈Xn P (s |x)P (x)
=
=
∑
x∈Xn
(
P (s |x)P (x)∑
x∈Xn P (s |x)P (x)
)
· E(ϑj |x),
=
∑
x∈Xn
(
P (s |x)P (x)∑
x∈Xn P (s |x)P (x)
)
· a
x
j + stj
n+ s
. (B.4)
It can be checked that the denominator of (B.4) is positive and therefore condi-
tioning on events with zero probability is not a problem in this setting. (B.4) is a
convex sum of fractions and is therefore a continuous function of t on T . Denote
by xj the dataset of length n composed only by outcomes xj , i.e., the dataset
with ax
j
j = n and a
xj
h = 0 for each h 6= j. For all x 6= xj we have
axj + stj
n+ s
≤ n− 1 + stj
n+ s
≤ n− 1 + s
n+ s
< 1,
on T (the closure of T ), only xj has
sup
t∈T
ax
j
j + stj
n+ s
= sup
t∈T
n+ stj
n+ s
= 1.
A convex sum of fractions smaller than or equal to one is equal to one, only if the
weights associated to fractions smaller than one are all equal to zero and there
are some positive weights associated to fractions equal to one. If P (s |xj) = 0,
then (B.4) is a convex combination of fractions strictly smaller than 1 on T and
therefore P (Xn+1 = xj | s) < 1. If P (s |xj) 6= 0, then letting tj → 1, and
consequently th → 0 for all h 6= j, according to (B.1), we have P (xj) → 1 and
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P (x)→ 0 for all x 6= xj , and thus, using (B.4),
1 ≥ P (Xn+1 = xj | s) ≥ lim
tj→1
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) =
P (s |xj)P (xj)n+s
n+s
P (s |xj)P (xj) = 1.
If we have observed a manifest variable Si = sh with λSthj = 0, it means that
the observation excludes the possibility that the underlying value of Xi is xj ,
therefore P (s |xj) = 0 and thus
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) < 1.
On the other hand, if P (Xn+1 = xj | s) < 1, it must hold that P (s |xj) =
0, i.e., that we have observed a realization of a manifest that is incompatible
with the underlying (latent) outcome xj . But a realization of a manifest that is
incompatible with the underlying (latent) outcome only if the observed manifest
variable was Si = sh with λSihj = 0.
3. Having observed a manifest variable Si = sh, such that λSihj 6= 0 and λSihr = 0
for each r 6= j in {1, . . . , k}, we are sure that the underlying value of Xi is xj .
Therefore, P (s |x) = 0 for all x with axj = 0. It follows from (B.4) that
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) =
∑
x∈Xn, axj>0 P (s |x)P (x) ·
axj+stj
n+s∑
x∈Xn, axj>0 P (s |x)P (x)
,
which is a convex combination of terms
axj + stj
n+ s
≥ a
x
j
n+ s
≥ 1
n+ s
,
and is therefore greater than zero for each t ∈ T . It follows that
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) ≥ 1
n+ s
> 0.
On the other hand, if we do not observe a manifest variable as described above,
it exists surely at least one x with axj = 0 and P (s |x) > 0. In this case, using
(B.4) and letting tj → 0, we have, because of (B.1), that P (x)→ 0 for all x with
axj > 0. It follows that
lim
tj→0
P (X = xj | s) = lim
tj→0
∑
x∈Xn, axj=0 P (s |x)P (x) ·
axj+stj
n+s∑
x∈Xn, axj=0 P (s |x)P (x)
.
Assume for simplicity that, for all h 6= j, th 6→ 0, then P (x) > 0 for all x with
axj = 0 and P (x) 6→ 0. Because, with axj = 0, we have
lim
tj→0
axj + stj
n+ s
= lim
tj→0
0 + sti
n+ s
= 0,
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we obtain directly,
0 ≤ P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = inf
t∈T
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) ≤ lim
tj→0
P (Xn+1 = xj | s) = 0. 2
Corollary 8 is a direct consequence of Theorem 7.
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